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Abstract
Catalans’ demands for self-government were always attuned to the national emancipation movements in the rest of Europe. This was 
one way of projecting the movement abroad and seeking strategic models and international support, even though only occasionally 
and with no lasting ties except Catalonia’s participation in the Congress of European Nationalities starting in 1926. This organisation 
encompassed the national minorities which were theoretically safeguarded by the League of Nations. The time span of this article 
ranges from 1885 to 1939. The Irish and Czech national movements were the most influential ones outside the sphere of Marxist ideol-
ogy. In the 1930s, curiosity about and admiration for the status of the nationalities within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was 
based on an idealised image which the circumstances of the 1936 Spanish Civil War contributed to feeding.
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From its inception, political Catalanism sought to frame 
its claims for Catalonia’s self-governance within the 
framework of the European nationalities without a state 
of their own. It viewed this as a form of international soli-
darity, a means of projecting the movement abroad and a 
way of seeking strategic models, and it embodied the con-
scious internationalisation of Catalan nationalism. In this 
article, we shall not examine Catalanism’s relations with 
other national movements within Spain, such as the 
Basque and Galician movements; rather we shall limit 
ourselves to its relations with movements outside the bor-
ders of the Spanish state.8
We should distinguish four periods on this subject 
which reflect the internal evolution of political Catalan-
ism. The first ranges from 1880 to 1901, that is, from the 
first Catalanist Congress to the first election victory in 
Barcelona of a Catalanist political party worthy of this 
name, the Lliga Regionalista de Catalunya (Regionalist 
League of Catalonia). The second spans from 1901 to 
1919. It began with the widespread campaign for Catalan 
autonomy which came in the wake of World War I and 
ended in failure by the majority opposition in the Spanish 
Parliament during the reign of Alphonse XIII. This was 
also when the first Catalan pro-independence political or-
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ganisation was formed, with Francesc Macià at the helm, 
which won a striking minority of votes in the elections. 
The third period runs from 1919 until 1931, with the 
change of regime in Spain after the fall of the dictatorship 
of General Primo de Rivera (1923-1930) and the creation 
of the first autonomous government of Catalonia, the 
Generalitat (1931), presided over by Francesc Macià, who 
achieved the 1932 Charter of Self-Government under 
Spain’s Second Republic. The fourth period spans from 
1931 to 1939 and encompasses the Spanish Civil War 
from 1936 until 1939. The Franco dictatorship, World 
War II and the post-war period fall outside the scope of 
analysis of this article, although they signalled a profound 
rupture from which Catalonia was just beginning to 
emerge starting in 1976-1977, after the death of General 
Francisco Franco.
The first united platform for political Catalanism was 
the Centre Català (Catalan Centre) founded in 1882 by 
Valentí Almirall, a federal republican who was disen-
chanted, like other Catalans, by the failure of Spain’s 
short-lived First Republic of 1873 and opposed to the re-
turn to absorbing centralism through the monarchic res-
toration of the Bourbons in 1875. Political Catalanism 
aimed to be a transversal, autonomist – not separatist – 
movement. It aimed to be organised apart from all the 
Spanish political parties – both monarchic and republican 
– and to search for a pragmatic political way without sub-
ordinating Catalonia’s autonomy to regime change in 
Spain, which was called accidentalism in politics. It also 
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Catalanism, in the late 19th century the influence of the 
oeuvre of Hippolyte Taine and the French positivist revi-
sionism towards the mark of Jacobinism and the legacy of 
the French Revolution were considerable.
The fleeting interest in the Hungarian 
model and the more lasting admiration of 
the Czech model
As noted, there were uniformist, centralist republics like 
France and federal or confederal monarchies like the Aus-
tro-Hungarian Empire and Germany. For this reason, the 
possibility that the Spanish monarchy could follow a 
model similar to the composite monarchy was not dis-
carded, as stated in the so-called “Memorial de Greuges” – 
the Memòria en defensa dels interessos morals i materials 
de Catalunya (Report in Defence of the Moral and Material 
Interests of Catalonia) – submitted to King Alphonse XII in 
1885 by a broad, heterogeneous set of industrial protection-
ists, Renaixença literati, jurists defending Catalan law and 
Catalan politicians critical within the regime.
After the 1866 defeat to Prussia, Austria had recognised 
Hungary’s national rights in a dual monarchy, which drew 
the Catalanists’ attention. The autonomist message that 
the Lliga de Catalunya (League of Catalonia) addressed to 
the reigning Queen of Spain, Maria Cristina – an Austrian 
– in 1888 mentioned the example of the Austro-Hungari-
an Empire. The difference in the importance of Catalonia 
within the Spanish monarchy compared to the impor-
tance of Hungary within the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
partly invalidated the model, but the Catalanists’ admira-
tion waned less for this reason than for the fact that in 
Hungary the rights of the Slavic minorities like the Croats 
and Slovenians and the Romanians of Transylvania were 
not recognised. What is more, the Hungarian oligarchy’s 
effective reluctance to implement universal suffrage, in-
troduced in the western part of the empire in 1907, stripped 
the political regime of Hungary of democratic prestige in 
the eyes of the Catalans.
They then set their sights on Czech nationalism, which 
fought for autonomy from Vienna despite opposition 
from the Germanic minority in Bohemia. The Czech liter-
ary and cultural renaissance was similar to the one taking 
place in Catalonia, and in fact the adoption of the term 
“nationalism” to identify Catalanism was due to the Czech 
influence. Likewise, poet Jacint Verdaguer’s relations with 
Sisigmund Bouska symbolise the literary facet of the par-
allelism between the Catalan and Czech movements. In 
1911, Czech socialism became organised into a party in-
dependent of its Austrian counterpart, which would have 
been inconceivable for Spanish socialism. National senti-
ment was spread equally among all the social echelons in 
Bohemia, and this impressed the Catalans.
In 1906, an article which appeared in the Catalanist 
magazine Joventut signed by Benet R. Barrios declared the 
author’s admiration of the fact that the Czechs, against all 
aimed to overcome the struggle between Catholic fanati-
cism and anti-clericalism after three civil wars, the Carlist 
wars. The last one had just ended in Catalonia in 1875 
with the military defeat of the anti-liberal traditionalists 
who had risen up in 1872.
The earliest strands of propaganda from the Centre 
Català were claims for the official use of Catalan in all sit-
uations, especially at schools and in the administration of 
justice, and the defence of Catalan civil law, which was 
threatened with extinction by the Castile-based codifica-
tion of the Spanish Civil Code in 1889. The goal was to 
develop the consciousness of a collective identity through 
knowledge of the country’s history, folklore and natural 
heritage and by encouraging excursionism and choral 
singing.
The fact that political Catalanism emerged when Catalan 
literature was already reaching its early degree of matu-
rity and modernity explains the feeling of fraternity that 
Catalanists felt towards the regionalism emanating from 
Occitanian literature with the Félibrige. The poet Frederic 
Mistral was admired and known in Catalonia. The mis-
conception that Limousin – a synonym of Occitanian – 
was the same language as Catalan or its initial source still 
persisted. However, the quest for explicitly political na-
tionalist models meant that soon the interest in the 
Provençal Félibriges waned given their exclusive literary 
nature. The hegemonic pretensions of the Occitanian 
writers were rejected in Catalonia, while Mistral’s affilia-
tion with the Ligue de la Patrie Française (League of the 
French Fatherland) was disconcerting. However, the Catalan 
press’ attention to regionalism in the French Republic 
persisted, with a tendency to blow it out of proportion de-
spite its scant political influence. Beyond conservative 
Figure 1. Valentí Almirall. His models included the Swiss Confed-
eration and the United States of America, but he accepted the solu-
tion of the Catalan claims within a composite monarchy in the style 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
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collar workers, while salaried workers and freelance arti-
sans accounted for 38% of the total.
Ireland’s Home Rule was not approved at that time be-
cause of opposition not only from English conservatives 
and Orange unionists from Ulster but also from certain 
sectors in the governing liberal party itself. However, in-
terest in Ireland did not wane in Catalonia. Irish national-
ism was more deeply rooted and widespread than Catalan 
nationalism, yet its language, Gaelic, was losing ground to 
English without a literary renaissance as sweeping as the 
one taking place in Catalan. Ireland was an economically 
somewhat underdeveloped country with significant emi-
gration, the opposite of Catalonia, which had developed 
industry and attracted immigrants.
The message to George, King of the 
Hellenes, in 1897, and the message to the 
Finnish people in 1899
In 1897, the King of Greece sent an expedition to aid the 
Greeks on Crete, who had risen up against Turkish rule. 
He found himself isolated by the attitude of the major 
powers. Thirty-four prominent Catalan intellectuals and 
politicians signed a manifesto of solidarity with Greek ir-
redemptionism and the message was delivered to the 
Greek consul in Barcelona. The initiative was promoted 
by the Unió Catalanista (Catalanist Union). The most 
odds, had managed to educate 100,000 children in their 
language and were successfully resisting Germanisation. 
Prague had one Czech and one German university and 
two public polytechnics for the two communities, while in 
Spain the government would not allow education in Catalan 
and refused to create free professorships in Catalan litera-
ture, history and law at the state-run University of Barcelona. 
Its rationale was that education was not bilingual any-
where, a statement that the Czech example belied, as the 
Catalanists knew.
The Sokol movement was also admired in Catalonia; it 
was a gymnastic and cultural organisation which was also 
patriotic, inter-class and non-partisan. This organisation, 
which was popular among women and adolescents, had 
been founded by Miroslav Tyrs and Jindrich Fügner in 
1862; there were around 5,000 Slavic Sokols in 1891 and 
12,000 by 1907. Before World War I, the Sokols were in 
charge of the social democratic gymnastic clubs. In Cata-
lonia, regardless of how important the excursionist cen-
tres’ role was in spreading national Catalan conscious-
ness, they were a far cry from representing anything as 
sweeping as the Czech Sokol (“Falcon”) movement. The 
dissemination of the music by the famous Czech compos-
ers like Smetana and Dvorák also served to boost Czech 
prestige. Until 1914, claims for autonomy prevailed over 
claims for independence in the Czech national move-
ment, and this enhanced its parallelism with the Catalans’ 
claims. Between the world wars, with the independence of 
Czechoslovakia, the Catalanists’ admiration would only 
grow.1 However, we must now return to the 19th century.
The Irish autonomist and parliamentary 
model and the Catalans’ message to 
Parnell in 1886
In 1886, Charles Stewart Parnell seemed to be on the verge 
of achieving Home Rule for Ireland from the British Par-
liament through the decision of liberal Prime Minister 
Gladstone. To the Catalanists who wanted to build a par-
liamentary party, the Irish model was extremely relevant. 
For the more traditional Catholic Catalanists, the impor-
tance of Catholicism in the Irish national identity was ap-
pealing, just as it was in the Polish movement. For the left-
ist Catalanists like Josep Narcís Roca i Farreras, the Irish 
nationalist movement was exemplary because it associat-
ed agrarian reform – promoted by the Land League – and 
popular social interests with the national cause, a factor 
regarded as basic to the future success of political Catalan-
ism yet which was missing at that time.
The Catalanist newspaper L’Arc de Sant Martí issued 
an appeal to sign a congratulatory message for Parnell in 
1886, and in 1887 it published an extraordinary issue enti-
tled Catalunya a Irlanda (Catalonia to Ireland). A total of 
2,886 individuals signed it, which surged to 6,000 by 
1887.2 The broad swath of society that they represented is 
surprising: 272 signatories identified themselves as blue-
Figure 2. Charles Stewart Parnell, the Irish nationalist leader who 
was sent a message of solidarity and homage from Barcelona.
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al republicans – on the war with Cuba and their reluctance 
to let themselves be convinced by Spanish obfuscation 
which was unable to avoid a war with the United States, 
which ended disastrously for Spain in 1989. One year ear-
lier, in 1897, when the Spanish government granted Cuba 
autonomy, the Catalanists viewed this as an encouraging 
precedent for their cause, but it was too late and Cuba’s 
separation came with American intervention.
Poland, martyred and torn apart by three powers, in-
spired the sympathy of the Catalanist press, which cen-
sured Germany’s Germanisation policy. In the opinion of 
the Catholic Catalan regionalists, Polish patriotism had 
the added value of its religious component. However, 
Poland was too dissimilar to the circumstances in Catalonia 
to serve as a useful referent.
The message to the Finnish people was the last one that 
the Unió Catalanista sent in June 1899 to support the cause 
of a European people prior to the new century. Twenty 
associations and 15 newspapers belonging to the Unió 
Catalanista signed it. The message was translated into 
Finnish by a Swede living in Barcelona so it could be pub-
lished in the Finnish press, although we do not know 
whether it actually was.
The Catalan message to the Finnish people in 1899 con-
tained a passage similar to the one sent to the King of 
Greece: “The Catalans, who live as you do, subjugated un-
der the yoke of foreign domination, who like Finland are 
different from the state to which we have been chosen to be 
associated, when we hear your plaints we have shuddered, 
when we think that your fatherland is also enslaved, that it 
also lives under the power of a stronger state, always the 
most barbarous one, never the most advanced.”
Finland had shifted from Swedish to Russian hands in 
1809, but it had managed to conserve broad autonomy. 
Finnish cultural identity had gained ground during the 
19th century over Swedish cultural influence, which had 
predominated until then. However, in 1899 Tsar Nicholas 
II deprived the Finnish Diet of its legislative power, dis-
solved the Finnish army and imposed Russian as the offi-
cial language. Taking advantage of the Russian Revolu-
tion of 1905, upon the defeat to Japan, the Finnish won 
back their rights lost in 1899 and the Finnish Diet voted 
on a constitution with a single chamber instead of the one 
that had existed until then, which was divided into four 
parts. It also implemented universal suffrage for men, 
which was extended to women in 1906. Once tsarism re-
covered from its concessions to the revolutionary move-
ment in 1905, the Finnish were stripped of their freedoms. 
With the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Finland won its 
independence, although this was accompanied by a civil 
war in which the Russian Bolsheviks supported the “Reds” 
and the Germans the “Whites”, who ultimately won. The 
1918 armistice led to Finland’s definitive independence in 
the midst of harsh rightist repression after three months 
of civil war. However, in 1919 Finland instated a liberal 
republican regime which the social democrats started to 
govern in 1926.
subversive paragraph of the message said that if Catalonia 
had a vote in the concert of peoples, it would take Greece’s 
side because “we know all too well, to our own misfor-
tune, what foreign domination is, to never countenance it 
again wherever it is, regardless of whether it affects Turks 
or Christians”. The Orfeó Català and the Catalunya Nova 
choir closed the event with their singing. Eighteen maga-
zines and 28 Catalanist organisations joined the affair, 
and several European newspapers reported on it.3
The second Cuban insurrection against Spanish domi-
nation had gotten underway in 1895, followed the next 
year by the first Philippine uprising. At the same time, the 
atmosphere was tense because of the anarchist bombs that 
were set off in Barcelona between 1893 and 1896 in a 
process that culminated with the 1897 execution of five 
anarchist workers and numerous rulings of prison and 
banishment. In this context, the Spanish government’s 
tolerance of Catalanism vanished, and the first repression 
against it was waged. The Catalanist newspapers La Renaix-
ença and Lo Regionalista were suspended, as was an event 
put on by the Centre Català of Sabadell on the situation in 
Crete. Only the federal republicans, led by Vallès i Ribot, 
declared their solidarity with the Catalanists, stressing 
their similar objectives.
We should also note the critical vantage point held by 
the Catalanist spokesmen – just like the majority of feder-
Figure 3. Flag of the Unió Catalanista featuring Saint George, the pa-
tron saint of Catalonia, slaying the dragon portrayed in a Modernista 
aesthetic.
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push and development of democracy, served as a point of 
reflection, even though the context bore no similarity 
with Catalonia’s.
This time no manifesto of solidarity with the trium-
phant Norwegians was necessary. In July 1905, Eugeni 
d’Ors, the intellectual who would become the most influ-
ential figure in the new Catalan cultural current which he 
dubbed Noucentisme, published a paradoxical article en-
titled “Noruega imperialista” (Imperialist Norway) in the 
nationalist republican newspaper El Poble Català. At that 
time, European imperialism had not yet been impugned 
as it would increasingly be after World War I. Even the 
Third French Republic, the democratic model for Cata-
lanist leftists, was colonialist and would further boost its 
overseas holdings with the protectorate of Morocco in 
1911.
Some Catalanist intellectuals wanted to articulate 
Catalan nationalism with imperialism as a form of ideo-
logical universalisation. Imperialism was synonymous 
with political intervention abroad and with overcoming 
liberal individualism. The goal was to avoid the danger of 
localism even though Catalanism had always represented 
Europeanisation more than closure to the outside world. 
Norway was merely a pretext for countering the separa-
tist tendencies within Catalanism. As Ors said: “The 
small peoples whose awareness of a mission to be accom-
plished makes their spirit grand – Norway, Catalonia – 
also aspire to Imperialism. All of them work for the Re-
construction of the City, trying to become the heirs to the 
opulent legacy of Mother Rome.” There was criticism of 
nationalism as a form of desegregating regionalism, and 
Eugeni d’Ors ended up blurring the reality by saying that 
the ideal of Norway was not “a happy Norway but a 
strong Scandinavia. Norway’s independence is a step to-
wards the reconstruction of Scandinavia [...] Prussia cre-
ated today’s Germanic Empire; Norway will be the Prussia 
of the future Scandinavia.”5
Enric Prat de la Riba, who defined Catalan nationalism 
in his 1906 book La Nacionalitat Catalana (The Catalan 
Nationality), tried to paint imperialism as the peak of any 
nationalism. However, the practical translation that he 
extracted from this concession to the spirit of the times 
was Catalan interventionism in Spanish politics.6 To this 
he added the old Iberian ideal, yet in a dysfunctional guise 
because it was not accompanied by political relations with 
Portugal in this direction. It was the myth of Iberian unifi-
cation set forth by Castilian Spain to offset the autonomy 
of Catalonia, yet without including Portugal because of 
the unlikely hypothesis that it would join the Iberian fed-
eration voluntarily with the guarantee of Catalonia and 
the Basque Country as autonomous entities. Prat de la 
Riba ended his book with a paragraph brimming with fan-
tasy in which he momentarily departed from the realism 
that was perennially his hallmark: “Then it would be the 
time to work to reunite the Iberian peoples, from Lisbon 
to the Rhône, within a single state, a single empire; and if 
the reborn Spanish nationalities were capable of bringing 
The Unió Catalanista sent yet another message of soli-
darity to the President of the Republic of Transvaal, 
Kruger, during the Boer War against the English (1899-
1902). This message was presented in November 1900 by 
delegates from the Unió Catalanista in Paris. The Boers of 
South Africa did not serve as a model for the Catalanists 
in the way that the historical European nationalities could, 
but the Voortrekkers, the descendants of the Dutch, did 
earn the sympathy of a certain swath of public opinion in 
Catalonia, as they did in other parts of Europe. British im-
perialism perceived its isolation and the disapproval ema-
nating from Europe. Its victory came at a much higher 
cost than it had imagined. Later, some Catalanists stressed 
Britain’s caution in its dealings on autonomy with the 
white victors despite the racial segregation that character-
ised the South African Union, and later the Republic, for 
many years.
The messages of support to the Irish, the Greeks of 
Crete, the Finnish people and the Boers did not give rise 
to formal relations with these movements; rather they 
were more internal to Catalonia. The attention paid in 
Catalonia to concurrent national movements was meant 
to demonstrate that Catalanism was situated within a Eu-
ropean context that was associated with modernity more 
than with the memory of the past.4
Admiration for the bloodless separation 
of Norway in 1905
Catalanism was poised to become a mass movement 
before the sweeping victory of the electoral coalition of 
Solidaritat Catalana (Catalan Solidarity) in 1907, when 
the bloodless separation of Norway and Sweden, which 
was far from Catalonia in all senses, took place in 1905. 
Norway had belonged to the Kingdom of Sweden since 
1815 after having been dependent on Denmark. In fact, it 
was a dual monarchy. Only the person of the sovereign 
and foreign policy were shared. Norway had broad auton-
omy, while its merchant marine and industry were grow-
ing apace with the political rights of its citizens, who se-
cured universal male suffrage in 1898, which came to 
include women in 1907.
The Swedish government tried to get Sweden’s inter-
ests to prevail over those of Norway, and in June 1905 the 
Storting or Parliament of Norway proclaimed its separa-
tion from Sweden. Prince Charles of Denmark became 
the King of Norway, and Sweden did not attempt to re-
gain sovereignty over it utilising weapons. This excep-
tional Scandinavian example of independence with no 
war jolted Catalan public opinion, which was already pre-
disposed to feel sympathy towards Norway because the 
Catalans admired the theatre of Ibsen and Björnson and 
were familiar with Grieg’s music. The prestige of a small 
country’s culture abroad, albeit a country so different to 
Catalonia, with a literary renaissance in the vernacular 
during the 19th century accompanied by the economic 
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more accurately, we do not any people to be enslaved and 
annihilated, not even the most backwards peoples, through 
the actions of white barbarians”.7 And in 1906 he further 
stressed: “True universalism is the kind that does not ask 
anyone to give up anything [...], the kind that does not ac-
cept imperialist actions, not even to universalise; it is the 
opposite of colonisation, yet the defender of the universal 
spread of progress and civilisation”. Coherent with this line 
of thinking, Martí i Julià, a radical Catalan nationalist, was 
against the Moroccan War aimed at bringing the northern 
part of this kingdom into the Spanish protectorate.
In January 1914, Martí i Julià stated that the socialisa-
tion of wealth was the precondition for the socialisation of 
the fatherland, and that only in this way can the father-
land be for everyone. In 1915, he declared that without 
socialism there could be no national emancipation and 
that without this national emancipation socialism was 
merely a negation. Martí i Julià believed that nationalists 
had to be socialists out of patriotism and that socialists 
had to fight for the emancipation of the oppressed nation-
alities in order to truly be international. Both had to coun-
ter the imperialisms that had unleashed the world war. If 
socialist internationalism had been unable to prevent the 
Great War, it was because it was not truly international, 
rather only inter-state.
Since the Catalanist left had entered into a period of de-
cline after 1914 and the Catalanist right had become hege-
monic in the elections in Catalonia, Martí i Julià believed 
it necessary to turn the Unió Catalanista into a nationalist 
Catalan social democratic party. His attempt was a whole-
sale failure. He died in 1917; however, his thinking re-
mained influential. During his lifetime he was a dissent-
ing voice in the wilderness. He was outside of Spanish 
socialism, which was in the minority in Catalonia and was 
divorced from Catalanism. Yet Martí i Julià was even fur-
ther from the majority syndicalism in Catalonia, which 
was dominated by the anarchosyndicalists, who were equally 
indifferent to the Catalanist movement.
When a former colleague of Martí i Julià, Manuel Serra i 
Moret, the founder along with others of the Unió Socialista 
de Catalunya in 1923, wrote the prologue to the Catalan 
translation of Marx and Engels’ 1848 Communist Mani-
festo, he warned that the statement that the proletariat had 
no fatherland did not mean that they should not have one 
and that they would not have one in the future.8 Serra i 
Moret proposed a Catalan socialism that was organisa-
tionally independent of the Partido Socialista Obrero Es-
pañol (Socialist Workers’ Party of Spain, PSOE) and com-
mitted to the cause of Catalonia’s autonomy. His ideal was 
direct Catalan participation in the Socialist International, 
which would not have been allowed. It was an aspiration 
for international recognition of the Catalan nationality 
which would come true, albeit problematically, with the 
Communist International in 1936.
this ideal to fruition, if they were capable of imposing it 
the way Bismarck’s Prussia imposed the ideal of Germanic 
imperialism, the new Iberia would be able to be held up to 
the supreme degree of imperialism: it would be able to ac-
tively intervene in the governance of the world with the 
other world powers; it would be able to extend yet again 
over barbarous lands and serve the high interests of hu-
manity by guiding the backwards, uncultivated peoples 
towards civilisation.”
Prat de la Riba became the President of the Provincial 
Council of Barcelona through Solidaritat Catalana’s elec-
tion victory in 1907, and seven years later he was elected 
the founding President of the Mancomunitat de Catalunya, 
a federation of the four Catalan provincial councils of 
Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona. However, this 
regional organisation never managed to achieve autono-
my for Catalonia. Prat de la Riba died in 1917, and his 
early death fostered unanimous praise of his figure, which 
in his lifetime had been criticised by the Catalanist left.
The ideal of an international solidarity 
of subjugated European nationalities: 
Domènec Martí i Julià
The antithesis between a national freedom movement and 
imperialism was crystal clear in the eyes of one radical 
Catalan nationalist, Domènec Martí i Julià, the President 
of the Unió Catalanista since 1903. This confederation of 
patriotic organisations founded in 1891 had remained a 
cross-cutting, apolitical federation which aspired to act as 
the single matrix for political Catalanism, even though it 
was in fact marginalised by both the parliamentary left 
and right within Catalan nationalism. Martí i Julià re-
mained linked to a naturalist and positivist vision of Cata-
lanism, a distant cry from disorienting myths like imperi-
alism. He hailed from republican federalism and vividly 
sensed the need to link Catalan nationalism to social re-
forms so that Catalanism could gain a majority base among 
the people.
Upon the introduction of imperialism into Catalan na-
tionalist theorisation, Martí i Julià said: “Ultra-modern 
imperialism is nothing other than Nietzschean individu-
alism applied to collective organisms”. Martí i Julià repu-
diated the irrational vitalism influenced by Nietzsche. By 
tying nationalism to emancipation, he believed that na-
tionalism was incompatible with imperialism, a myth that 
he regarded as pathetic when applied to a subjugated na-
tionality such as the Catalans: “Imperialism is a secular-
ised, foolish conception; nationalism is the plenitude of 
nature”, he declared in the magazine Joventut in February 
1905 in response to Eugeni d’Ors.
Back in 1901, Martí i Julià had written that the “universal 
fatherland” was a single fatherland and that it was a step 
backwards because the law of life was distinction and evo-
lution, not uniformity. In the same article he expressed his 
anti-imperialism: “We do not want to civilise anyone, or 
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The common thread in Rovira’s work, just like in that of 
Prat de la Riba, was distinguishing between fatherland and 
state, between a socio-cultural reality and a political struc-
ture.
Rovira i Virgili viewed federalism as the solution to the 
problems of the subjugated nationalities, and he stated that a 
nationalist movement could become separatist depending 
on the politics of the dominant state. Certainly before the 
outbreak of World War I claims for autonomy through par-
liament and negotiations predominated in Irish and Czech 
nationalism, which only gave rise to claims for independ-
ence with the Great War and in view of the political unfeasi-
bility of autonomy without violence. Until the outbreak of 
World War I, the future president of the Czech Republic, 
Professor Masaryk, was an autonomist, not a separatist.
Rovira i Virgili noted that prior to 1914 the Czechs had 
not been in favour of the disintegration of the Austro-Hun-
garian Empire because they feared that Bohemia would be 
absorbed by Germany with the help of the Germanic mi-
nority from their country. Therefore, prior to World War I 
there were already fears of what Hitler went on to impose 
25 years later, namely Bohemia and Moravia’s submission 
and the segregation of Slovakia, deeds leading up to the 
outbreak of World War II in 1939.
The war of the nations
This was the title that Rovira i Virgili gave his book on 
World War I whose five volumes appeared between 1916 
and 1925. Certainly the Great War began with the magni-
cide in Sarajevo, in a Bosnia that had been in Austrian 
Antoni Rovira i Virgili’s Història dels 
moviments nacionalistes, 1912-1914 
The most notable effort to situate Catalonia’s national 
claims within the contemporary European context was 
Història dels moviments nacionalistes (History of the Na-
tionalist Movements), a book by Antoni Rovira i Virgili 
(1882-1949), at that time a journalist at the newspaper El 
Poble Català. He was a republican, leftist Catalan nation-
alist who would become one of the leading ideologues of 
this current, with books like Nacionalisme i federalisme 
(Nationalism and Federalism, 1917). 
When it was established in 1991, the University of Ta rra-
gona was named Universitat Rovira i Virgili after the jour-
nalist, a native of that city. The first volume in Rovira i 
Virgili’s history of nationalist movements was published in 
1912 and examined Finland, Poland, Li thuania, Ukraine, 
Schleswig, Alsace-Lorraine and Flanders. In the second 
volume, which came out in 1913, he discussed Bohemia, 
Slovakia, Trieste and Trentino, Croatia, Hungary and 
Transylvania. The third volume, published in July 1914, ex-
amined Albania, Epirus, Crete, Macedonia, Old Serbia and 
Armenia as well as the conflicts of interests between Aus-
tria, Italy and the Turkish Empire in the Balkans. This last 
volume ended with the cases of Ireland, the Basque Country 
and Catalonia, such that the entire international scene he 
examined ended with a synthesis of Catalanism.
In Spain, only one less comprehensive book appeared 
on the same topic prior to 1914, the one by the Basque 
nationalist Luis de Elizalde entitled Paises y razas. Las 
as piraciones nacionalistas en diversos pueblos (1913-1914) 
(Countries and Races: The Nationalist Aspirations of 
Different Peoples [1913-1914]), which was reissued in 
1999. The lack of a work in the Spanish market similar to 
Rovira i Virgili’s is the reason why it was translated into 
Spanish by the Barcelona publishing house Minerva in 
1919. It was issued in a single volume with a brief update 
of the events that had transpired until early that year. A 
second facsimile edition of the Spanish version of Rovira 
i Virgili’s work appeared in 1980 from the Hacer pub-
lishing house. The second edition of the Catalan original 
was published in Barcelona in 2008 on the initiative of 
the Base publishing house, this time with an epilogue by 
Xavier Ferré Trill and with the support of the Generali-
tat’s Centre of Contemporary History of Catalonia.
In 1912, the author of the prologue of Rovira i Virgili’s 
book was the jurist, economist and politician Pere Co romines, 
the leader of the party to which Rovira belonged at the time, 
the Unió Federal Nacionalista Republicana (Republican 
Nationalist Federal Union). Coromines stressed two con-
clusions from a book that aimed to be descriptive and avoid 
theorising. The first was that generalising on the criteria 
that define nationalities had to be avoided, given that each 
one evolves in its own specific way. The second conclusion 
was that “the dramatic episode of the nationalities is part of 
the evolution of the State in Europe”. Coromines noted that 
there had been a shift from citizens’ rights to nations’ rights. 
Figure 4. Antoni Rovira i Virgili, ideologue of Catalan 
republican nationalism.
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The radical Catalan nationalists wanted to believe that 
an allied victory would lead to the emancipation of the op-
pressed European nationalities, while the moderate Cata-
lanist party, which held the presidency of the Mancomuni-
tat de Catalunya, mainly shared the neutralism upheld by 
the Spanish governments at the time despite the fact that 
the indiscriminate submarine war declared by Germany 
was affecting the Spanish merchant marine. Marshall 
Joffre, the military head of the French army in the Battle of 
the Marne, was turned into a Catalan hero by Catalanist 
propaganda because he was from Roussillon. A group of 
Catalanist intellectuals from a variety of political stripes vis-
ited Perpignan in February 1916 to declare their solidarity 
to the people of Roussillon, located in Northern Catalonia, 
as part of the French state at war with Germany.11
The error of the nationalist Catalan left was believing 
that the allied powers were against Alphonse XIII’s reign 
in Spain and in favour of the country’s democratisation. 
Instead, English and French diplomats were against the 
anti-monarchic agitation in the summer of 1917 in Spain, 
a kingdom that they believed to be within their sphere of 
influence, thus rendering it inconceivable for it to take 
Germany’s side.
Almost 1,000 Catalan volunteers fought with the French 
Foreign Legion, a figure below the legendary 12,000 that 
circulated back then yet comparable to the number of 
Garibaldi Italians, Poles and Czechs, and much higher 
than the total of 2,500 volunteers from the rest of Spain. 
Leaders of the Unió Catalanista created the Comité de 
Germanor amb els Voluntaris Catalans (Brotherhood 
Committee with the Catalan Volunteers).12 The most na-
tionalistic cell of those Catalan volunteers considered it-
self the valid representation of Catalonia at the Paris Peace 
Conference. The Fourteen Points for Peace set forth by 
United States President Woodrow Wilson, who had justi-
fied the US’s intervention in the war after 1917, seemed to 
confirm that hope since they included nationalities’ right 
hands since 1908, a country at the heart of the war of the 
nationalities and the Balkan states, which had already 
been at war since 1912. Austria’s invasion of Serbia and 
Germany’s invasion of neutral Belgium made the leftist 
Catalanists, steadfast Francophiles, indignant.9
A more complex position was the one that inspired the 
active neutralism of the Manifest dels Amics de la Unitat 
Moral d’Europa (Manifesto of Friends of the Moral Uni-
ty of Europe) written by Eugeni d’Ors and signed by a 
significant number of Catalan intellectuals of diverse ide-
ologies, from conservatives like Miquel dels Sants Oliver 
and Ramon Rucabado to leftists like Andreu Nin, Rafael 
Campalans and Salvat-Papasseit. Published in December 
1914, it repudiated the war as a “European civil war” 
which had to end in a reconciliation of the values of Euro-
pean unity represented by France and Germany rekindled 
by classical Mediterraneanism. The interplay of freedom 
with authority, of democracy with the strong intervening 
state, had to emerge from the war. The French version of 
the Catalan Manifesto of Friends of the Moral Unity of 
Europe was published by Romain Rolland in the Journal 
de Genève on the 9th of January 1915, a fact which made 
the international headlines. There was an outcry against 
the manifesto in both France and Germany and in Cata-
lonia itself.10
Figure 5. Marshall Joffre. The Catalan nationalists adopted him as 
a Catalan hero because he was born in Roussillon. He presided over 
the Jocs Florals in Barcelona in May 1920.
Figure 6. Medals for the Catalan volunteers in the French army 
during World War I.
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It was succeeded in 1922 by Estat Català (Catalan State), a 
paramilitary organisation with Macià at the helm. The 
Catalan pro-independence flag had been designed in late 
1918, which added a blue triangle and a solitary star, in-
spired by the Cuban and US flags, in the middle to the 
traditional four red horizontal stripes over a golden back-
ground.15
The echoes of the Irish uprising
The House of Commons voted on Irish Home Rule in 
1912, but the veto in the House of Lords set it back two 
more years while the Orange unionists in Ulster armed 
themselves to oppose dependence on an autonomous 
government in Dublin. In 1914, the war served as the jus-
tification to postpone Ireland’s autonomy. Sinn Féin’s 
1916 Easter Rising in Dublin was put down with execu-
tions, imprisonment and banishment. The call for the 
Irish ranks to fight in Europe only accentuated the ma-
laise. The Catalanists’ trust that an allied victory would 
favour the subjugated nationalities led it to deplore Sinn 
Féin’s failed uprising in Dublin in 1916 because it could 
to self-determination. For a moment, Wilson was a popu-
lar figure venerated by the Catalanists.
A Catalan national committee was assembled in Paris 
that aimed to imitate the Czech example. It goal was to 
gain the allies’ support, but it proved to have no influence. 
The Czech success aroused a great deal of interest. Tomás 
Masaryk had gone into exile in Paris and ultimately se-
cured the support of the allied governments. He became 
the first President of the Republic of Czechoslovakia. 
Czech prisoners and deserters fought as volunteers along-
side the Russians during World War I. Masaryk himself 
went to Russia until the Bolshevik revolution. In 1918, the 
Czechoslovak legion had to cross all of Siberia in its fight 
with the Bolsheviks, who had given the order to disarm it. 
This ran counter to the agreement reached with the allies 
before the separate peace with Germany, which stipulated 
that the Czechs had to move to the French front.
When the armistice came and many European nation-
alities achieved independence, it also seemed to be the most 
propitious time for Catalonia to secure a negotiated auton-
omy from the Spanish government. However, the planned 
charter of self-government drawn up by the Catalan par-
liamentarians and the Mancomunitat de Catalunya in 
Barcelona in January 1919 was rejected by the Spanish 
Parliament, despite the moderation of the text.13 At the 
same time, the allies in Paris did not allow the Catalan 
question onto the agenda of the peace conference.
After this political fracas, a notably harsh class struggle 
began in industrial Catalonia characterised by the prolif-
eration of social attacks, which had started earlier. In 
Barcelona, they were the years of the thuggery called 
pistolerisme. The first Catalan pro-independence politi-
cal organisation also appeared in 1919, led by MP Franc-
esc Macià; initially it met little success in the elections.14 
Figure 7. Tomás Garrigue Masaryk, first president Czechoslovakia.
Figure 8. First photograph of the old flag of Estat Català. It is being 
exhibited by Catalan and North American hikers on Montserrat 
(1918). It was inspired by the Cuban and American flags and added 
the blue triangle (humanity) and the republican star above the four 
stripes of the Catalan flag..
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Estat Català, which had been organised as a paramilitary 
group in 1922 and was headed by MP Francesc Macià.
When the death of the Lord Mayor of Cork inspire Cat-
alanist sympathies, the fratricidal war among the Irish na-
tionalists had not yet broken out, a civil war between those 
who accepted the separation of Ulster and some limita-
tions for free Ireland in December 1921 in London and 
those who did not, including De Valera. The civil war 
among the Irish caused more deaths than the previous 
war between the Irish and the English, and even led to the 
deaths of nationalist leaders the likes of Michael Collins. It 
lasted until May 1923.
At the same time, the violence of the class struggle in 
Catalonia did not allow any autonomist front to be reas-
sembled, and the existing political stalemate went far to-
wards facilitating the September 1923 coup d’état in Bar-
celona by General Miguel Primo Rivera, the Captain 
General of Catalonia. Catalanism was persecuted and the 
Mancomunitat de Catalunya liquidated, so insurrectional 
separatism founds its justification in frustration of the le-
gal pathway towards autonomy.18
Macià, in exile in Paris, conspired against the Spanish 
dictatorship through donations from Catalans in the 
Americas – another similarity with Ireland – and pre-
pared an armed expedition that was to cross the Pyrenees.
However, at the same time the more moderate Catalan-
ists, who did not believe in the armed approach, launched 
paradiplomatic actions at the League of Nations head-
quartered in Geneva, presenting the case of Catalonia as 
one of the national minorities whose rights the League of 
Nations had pledged to defend. The insurrectional tack of 
the Irish was rejected by this sector.19
About the League of Nations and 
participation in the Congress of the 
Nationalities
In reality, the case of Catalonia was not about national mi-
norities that belonged to a state dominated by another na-
tionality, such as the Germans in Poland. The rights of 
these national minorities had to be defended by the League 
of Nations in order avoid conflicts that could trigger anoth-
er war. The case of the Catalans was the case of a nationality 
that had been minoritised in its own, unique territory by a 
state, Spain, which denied Catalans the right to use their na-
tive language in education and the courts. However, the ap-
peal to the League of Nations meant presenting Catalonia as 
a case similar to the national minorities, one way of interna-
tionally projecting the plight of the Catalans. However, the 
Catalan people were not included among the national mi-
norities protected by the peace treaties.
On the 24th of April 1924, Manuel Massó i Llorens, 
with the support of eleven other deputies from the group 
Acció Catalana, left an Appeal in Favour of Catalonia in 
Geneva addressed to the League of Nations. The need for 
active propaganda abroad had been defended earlier by 
benefit Germany. However, they also condemned the En-
glish army’s executions. Rovira i Virgili was the master-
mind behind this position.
In the 1918 elections at the end of the war, Sinn Féin, 
until then a minority in the Parliament, landed 73 of the 
105 Irish seats in the House of Commons, while the na-
tionalist autonomists only earned six and the unionists 
26. The Sinn Féin MPs refused to go to London and in-
stead set up an independent Parliament – the Dáil – in 
Dublin; they appointed Eamon de Valera President of 
the Republic of Ireland.16 On the 4th of February 1919, 
the autonomist Catalan MP Pere Rahola warned the 
Spanish Courts that Spain’s intransigency against Catalo-
nia’s demands for autonomy could lead to a surge in 
pro-independence feelings, as in Ireland after the failure 
of autonomism: “There, the ones who wanted to strike 
out by themselves won” he said, in allusion to Sinn Féin 
and the translation of the name (“We Ourselves”) into 
Spanish.
Great Britain, which was in an uncomfortable position 
at the peace conference, promised to resolve the Irish 
question, which could theoretically be regarded as includ-
ed on President Wilson’s points and had the support of 
the Irish in the United States. However, when the peace 
conference ended, the repression began in Ireland with a 
war of independence that discredited England in the eyes 
of the radical pro-ally Catalans, who were already quite 
disappointed because the great victorious powers had re-
fused to include the Catalan question among the issue of 
the nationalities to be emancipated at the Paris Peace 
Conference in Versailles.
The event that resonated the most in Catalonia was the 
death by inanition of Terence MacSwiney, the Lord Mayor 
of Cork, on the 25th of October 1920 in the English prison 
where he had been on a hunger strike for 73 days. He was a 
practising Catholic, and his martyrdom spurred the sym-
pathy of Catalan Catholics, especially after the bishops of 
Ireland had taken MacSwiney’s side. The President of the 
Provincial Council of Barcelona, Vallès i Pujals, sent a mes-
sage to Lloyd George demanding the release of the Lord 
Mayor of Cork from prison and freedom for Ireland. Simi-
lar messages were sent to London by the Unió Catalanista 
and the Centre Autonomista de Dependents del Comerç i 
de la Indústria (Autonomist Centre of Retail and Industry 
Clerks, CADCI), the largest retail and office workers’ asso-
ciation in Barcelona.
The Mayor of New York City, who had demanded the 
release of the Lord Mayor of Cork, ordered all the flags in 
his city to be flown at half-mast. Funerals for MacSwiney 
were held in many different towns in Catalonia, and several 
magazine monographs spotlighting Ireland were pub-
lished.17 Despite conservative Catalan autonomism’s sym-
pathies for the Irish plight, as a model it ran counter to the 
gradualist, parliamentary model which the Catalanist ma-
jority preferred, even though this approach was being 
blocked by the Spanish monarchy. Ireland’s insurrectional 
approach only fit with the new pro-independence group 
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by Lluís Nicolau d’Olwer, Idees i fets entorn de Paneuropa 
(Barcelona 1928), and the ones by Joan Estelrich, La qüestió 
de les minories nacionals i les vies del dret (Barcelona 1929) 
and La question des minorités et la Catalogne (Lausanne 
and Geneva 1929), as well as the book by Maspons i Angla-
sell, Punt de vista català sobre el procediment de protecció de 
les minories nacionals (Barcelona 1930). After that, Cata-
lanism had its sights set on the rights protected by the inter-
national agreements which Spain had signed so it could 
condemn their noncompliance in Catalonia.
The political shift in Spain in 1931 and the autonomy 
granted to Catalonia boosted the internal possibilities, 
which led to a loss of interest in international events de-
spite Catalonia’s presence in the Congress of European 
Nationalities held in 1933. However, the inoperability of 
the League of Nations also played a part. The departure of 
Nazi Germany, the League of Nations’ impotence to stop 
Japan’s aggression against China – both of them member 
countries – while Hitler was threatening European stabil-
ity undermined this international organisation’s authori-
ty and credibility. Precisely the issue of the national mi-
norities would be used by Hitler immediately before the 
outbreak of World War II in the case of Sudetenland.
The insurrectional tack inspired by 
Ireland and Garibaldi in the 1920s
Francesc Macià was in contact in Paris with representa-
tives of the Confederació Nacional del Treball (National 
Confederation of Labour, CNT), which was operating 
underground in Catalonia at the time, and with the Secretary 
General of the persecuted and minuscule Communist 
Party of Spain, José Bullejos. Macià received funds from 
the Catalans in the Americas for the expedition he was 
preparing. However, the money from the Americas was 
not enough, not even after adding the resources contrib-
uted by Macià’s wife, who had inherited a considerable 
amount of personal assets.
The influence of the Soviet model and the prestige of the 
Bolshevik Revolution were considerable among the youth 
in France preparing for the Estat Català venture, including 
Martí Vilanova, Josep Rovira and Jaume Miravitlles. The 
list of recommended reading provided to the Estat Català 
volunteers living in Toulouse was almost entirely commu-
nist, and it contained the most famous tracts by Lenin, 
Bukharin, Trotsky, Stalin, Labriola, Marx, Engels and Sorel.22 
However, Macià did not subordinate the emancipation of 
Catalonia to a social revolution.
In this context, it should come as no surprise that in the 
autumn of 1926, Macià travelled to Moscow to enlist the 
aid of the Communist International. There, he managed 
to meet first with Bukharin and finally with Zinoviev, who 
shortly thereafter fell into disgrace as the head of govern-
ment. Andreu Nin, a Catalan who had become a senior 
functionary in the Red Trade Union International, served 
as Macià’s interpreter. Zinoviev bid Macià farewell with 
Joan Estelrich in March 1920 with his La valoració in-
ternacional de Catalunya (International Assessment of 
Ca talonia). Estelrich served Francesc Cambó, the leader 
of the Lliga Regionalista de Catalunya, had been a minis-
ter in the Spanish government in 1918 and 1921, and had 
recently become a millionaire and patron. During the dic-
tatorship of General Primo de Rivera, the activities of the 
agents of Catalanism abroad penetrated two international 
associations outside the League of Nations yet which the 
League could not ignore: the International Union of As-
sociations for the League of Nations, headquartered in 
Brussels, and the Congress of European Nationalities, 
whose mandate was precisely to bring together the na-
tional minorities. The latter, set up in 1925, was head-
quartered in Vienna starting in 1927.20
The opportunities for Joan Estelrich, Lluís Nicolau 
d’Olwer, Alfons Maseras and other Catalanist agents to 
engage in paradiplomatic activities rose when Primo de 
Rivera’s Spain left the League of Nations in early 1926 to 
protest the denial of his demand to have a permanent seat 
on its Executive Council. The Catalanists achieved noth-
ing at the International Union of Associations for the 
League of Nations, but they did succeed at the Congress of 
European Nationalities, which was presided over by the 
Baltic-German MP from Estonia, Ewald Ammende. A 
Catalan delegation attended the second Congress of the 
Nationalities in 1926. They made it clear that they accept-
ed the Congress’ principles, which were identical to those 
of the League of Nations even though it seemed somewhat 
unwilling to enforce their implementation. However, the 
Catalan delegates also warned that they would not give up 
Catalonia’s right to self-governance, which went beyond 
the rights recognised for national minorities. The Catalan 
jurist Francesc Maspons i Anglasell became the President 
of the Congress of European Nationalities, which includ-
ed 40 national groups encompassing 50 million people.21 
Catalonia’s presence helped to counter the French propa-
ganda which painted the Congress of Nationalities as an 
instrument of Germany and Hungary to rectify the bor-
ders they had been assigned, which left their own national 
minorities inside other states.
Germany joined the League of Nations in 1926 with a 
permanent seat on its Executive Council, and Chancellor 
Gustav Stresemann’s visit to Spain in May 1929 was greet-
ed with hope by Catalans. However, Weimar Republic 
Germany did not want to fall out with the government of 
Primo de Rivera, which had rejoined the League of Na-
tions in 1928 and had the support of French and British 
diplomacy to prevent the Catalan claims from coming to 
fruition. The recommendation approved by the League of 
Nations that states not explicitly covered in the peace 
treaties should also respect and recognise the rights of na-
tional minorities was not a binding resolution, so the 
Spanish state was able to turn a blind eye toward it.
Of these efforts to project Catalans’ claims abroad, what 
remain are only useful reflections for situating the Catalan 
plight within the international legal context, as in the book 
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The insurrectional approach had failed, but Macià took 
a trip to America to rally the support of the Catalans in the 
American centres.26 The fall of Primo de Rivera in Janu-
ary 1930 opened up other prospects, and Macià decided to 
bring his group from Estat Català into the Esquerra Re-
publicana de Catalunya (Republican Left of Catalonia, 
ERC), a federal but not separatist party which, though just 
formed, roundly won the April 1931 elections, the first 
ones held in eight years.
Nonetheless, some of Macià’s followers refused to join 
the party that won the parliamentary majorities in Catalonia 
during the first half of the 1930s. Their irreducible Catalan 
nationalism prevented them from making concessions, 
which they viewed as acts of treason.27 One of these 
groups was Nosaltres Sols, the literal translation of the 
Gaelic “Sinn Féin” into Catalan, led by Daniel Cardona. 
But we should also take into account the tiny Partit Na-
cionalista Català (Catalan Nationalist Party), as well as the 
Estat Català-Partit Proletari (Catalan State-Proletarian 
Party). The latter adopted a position that was simultane-
ously Marxist-Leninist and nationalist, and in July 1936 it 
ended up merging with the socialists and communists in the 
Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (Unified Socialist 
Party of Catalonia, PSUC), which had declared itself an 
adherent of the Communist International since its found-
ing. In the same year, 1936, the other aforementioned na-
the words: “Tell the Catalans that we are the most fervent 
supporters of their independence.”
Despite the fine words and vague promises, Macià re-
turned empty-handed and had to conduct his guerrilla 
penetration solely with his own resources. The goal was to 
kindle the latent spirit of revolt among the people with the 
spark of the expedition of a handful of heroes. Should 
things go badly, as they did with Sinn Féin’s Easter Rising 
in 1916, the blood of the martyrs would later pave the way 
for a broader revolution, as it had in Ireland. This was the 
perspective of the group from Estat Català.
Macià managed to assemble around 60 anti-Fascist 
Ga ribaldi veterans from World War I in exile in France. 
The Garibaldi republicans had also devised a similar plan 
against the Italy of Mussolini, a good friend of Spain’s 
Primo de Rivera. The Garibaldi tack was also present in 
the expedition being planned by Macià.24 The operation 
got underway in November 1926. The French police in-
tercepted the participants at the border crossing at Prats 
de Molló, and around 100 of them were brought to trial in 
Paris and immediately expelled from France. The trial be-
came an act of propaganda for Catalan nationalism and 
Macià, while Ricciotti Garibaldi, the son of the famous 
driving force behind Italian unification, was arrested as a 
double agent and the dealings of Mussolini’s agents in 
France were revealed.25
Figure 9. Francesc Macià, resting his head on his hands on the far right, on the defendants’ bench of those accused in the Paris trial after their 
arrest in Prats de Molló.
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the fall of General Primo de Rivera and before the procla-
mation of the Republic. Palestra drew inspiration from 
the Czech Sokols and sent a representation to Prague led 
by Amadeu Serch, Batista i Roca’s right-hand man. Pal-
estra thus participated in the ninth federal festival of the 
Sokols in July 1932, but it was banned from parading with 
the Catalan flag due to pressure from Spanish diplomacy. 
“This incident served to remind us that Catalonia was still 
a dominated country, lest we forget it”, wrote Amadeu 
Serch, who published a leaflet the same year entitled 
L’exemple de Txecoslovàquia (The Example of Czechoslo-
vakia) with the intention of demonstrating the role played 
by the Sokols in the formation of a state of collective con-
sciousness that had paved the way for the national eman-
cipation on the occasion of World War I.
In 1932, the Sokols had 750,000 active members, the 
Czech socialist gymnastics organisation had 109,085 more 
and the Catholic Orel had 110,235. Despite its dynamism, 
Palestra, which aimed to train Catalan youth in a nonparti-
san way, never achieved a anything resembling a size com-
parable to that of its Czech model.30 Palestra had yet another 
reference: the Mendigoizals (mountain youth) of the Basque 
nationalist movement. The youth belonging to the parties at 
that time of intense, premature politicisation would rob Pal-
estra of much of the base it was targeted at and would frus-
trate its plans for a national Catalan youth front.
The Soviet model
The illusions that the Bolshevik Revolution aroused with-
in the trade union movement in Catalonia and elsewhere 
in October 1917 were of such a magnitude that the CNT, 
which was growing quickly, decided to conditionally join 
the Communist International in late 1919 despite the fact 
that most of the leaders of that prominent union were an-
archosyndicalists.
Imitating its example, and in the zeal to attract the sym-
pathy of the syndicalists from the CNT, Francesc Layret 
managed to get his party, the Partit Republicà Català (Catalan 
Republican Party), to join the Third International in Sep-
tember 1920. The agreement of the Partit Republicà Català 
assembly was never put into practice. However, if there had 
been real attempts to do so, it would have run into the se-
vere 21 conditions established by Lenin the previous Au-
gust on joining the new Moscow-led International, which 
stipulated the total subordination of the parties that joined 
it and required them to purge all social democratic mem-
bers. Francesc Layret was murdered on the 30th of Novem-
ber of the same year by thugs from the Sindicat Lliure, the 
enemy of the CNT, which had also in some ways been com-
bating the Sindicat Lliure. 
The Bolsheviks’ association of the emancipation of the 
nationalities in the Russian Empire with the worker and 
peasant revolution was an act of adaptation to the chaotic 
situation that made it easier for the communists to conquer 
the power based on the Soviets or workers’ councils, but it 
tionalist groups had joined Estat Català, which ended up 
being reassembled as an independence party by dissidents 
from the ERC, who had left this party after the failed Sixth 
of October uprising in 1934.28
The evolution of Estat Català-Partit Proletari reveals 
the degree of influence that the Soviet model and commu-
nist ideology would attain among retail, office and sala-
ried workers during the 1930s.
The last comparative essay on the Irish case was pub-
lished in October 1932 by Joan P. Fàbregas, a self-taught 
economist, and it was entitled Irlanda i Catalunya, pa-
ral·lelisme político-econòmic (Ireland and Catalonia, Po-
litical-Economic Parallelism). After comparing the na-
tionalist conceptions of Cosgrave and De Valera, Fàbregas 
compared the situation of politically independent Ireland 
with that of a Catalonia that had just attained its charter of 
self-government, which the author considered insuffi-
cient, while he criticised the hegemonic Catalan party, 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, for having become 
conciliatory. While Ireland needed to achieve economic 
independence, Catalonia needed political independence. 
Fàbregas lamented the failure of Briand’s pro ject for Euro-
pean economic union, which he linked to disarmament 
and peace, and he proposed that the small European na-
tionalities form their own union. Joan P. Fàbregas served 
as the Minister of the Economy of the government of the 
Generalitat de Catalunya between September and Decem-
ber 1936 on behalf of the CNT in the midst of the civil war 
and revolution.
The example of Czechoslovakia
The independence of the Czechoslovak Republic with the 
support of the allies in the autumn of 1918 and the stably 
democratic and socially reformist nature of the new state 
after almost 300 years of subjugation reinforced the pres-
tige of the Czech model in Catalonia, a model distinct 
from Ireland’s Sinn Féin republicanism and from the 
Soviet model, given its liberal democracy. In his essay 
Política vol dir pedagogia (Politics Means Pedagogy, 1933), 
after alluding to Poland under the dictatorship of Pilsud-
ski, the Catalanist social democrat Rafael Campalans said 
that the enthusiasm towards the new states of the nation-
alities that used to be oppressed which emerged from the 
Versailles Treaty had cooled off in view of their subse-
quent political evolution: “One of them, however, has ac-
quitted itself with full honours: Czechoslovakia”.
Josep Maria Batista i Roca, an ethnographer and excur-
sionist, founded Catalan scouting in 192729 – he had 
learnt about the British model of the Boy Scouts – and 
shortly thereafter, in 1930, he created in Barcelona a patri-
otic youth organisation devoted to physical, intellectual 
and civic education: Palestra. For the presidency of this 
organisation, he sought the linguist who had normalised 
written Catalan, the indispensable base of its survival, 
Pompeu Fabra. This new association was founded after 
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manifestation of the strength of the working class, the first 
pathway that must be taken to reach the future and fulfil 
its mission. However, it is not the only pathway, nor per-
haps the one that goes the furthest.”
In any event, the communist tactics could lead to mis-
takes. When the workers’ party had to combat the national-
ism of its own national bourgeoisie in fraternity with the 
workers from other nations, these tactics could be justifiable 
in relations between parties from two hostile states, but it 
was very ambiguous in the internal case of a state with one 
dominant nation and other dominated nations. Even prior 
to 1917, the Bolsheviks had perennially oppo sed the organi-
sation of parties of the different nationalities in Russia.33
It was after 1930 that the communist theses on the na-
tional emancipation movements spread in Catalonia, espe-
cially after the regime change in 1931.34 It should be noted 
that there was virtual wholesale lack of knowledge about 
the reality in the Soviet Union. Only a handful of Catalans 
had travelled to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
These journeys were recounted in a series of articles, some 
of which gave rise to books such as the ones by the con-
servative liberals Josep Pla –Viatge a Rússia (Journey to 
Russia), with the first edition in 1925 and the second in 
1990– and Ferran Valls i Taberner –Un viatger català a la 
Rússia de Stalin (A Catalan Traveller in Stalin’s Russia), ar-
ticles published in La Veu de Catalunya in 1928 which were 
assembled in book form in 1985– as well as the book by the 
centre-left liberal democrat Carles Pi i Sunyer, La Rússia 
que vaig veure (1931) (The Russia I Saw [1931]) published 
by the Carles Pi i Sunyer Foundation in 2009, with a sec-
ond, more definitive version: Com vaig veure Rússia (How I 
Saw Russia), a set of newspaper articles that appeared in 
late 1935 and early 1936, also published in book form by the 
Carles Pi i Sunyer Foundation in 1992.
These travellers generally conveyed their satisfaction 
with the respect for national rights and their solution with-
in the legal framework of the USSR. Valls i Taberner was a 
member of the Lliga Regionalista, later called the Lliga 
Catalana (Catalan League). Upon the Civil War, he had to 
move to the anti-republican zone and forswore his previ-
ous Catalanist political credo which years earlier had pitted 
him against the Primo de Rivera dictatorship. Pi i Sunyer 
left Acció Catalana to join the Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya and became the regional minister of the govern-
ment of the Generalitat de Catalunya in 1933 and Mayor of 
Barcelona in 1934. He was the author of a book, L’aptitud 
econòmica de Catalunya (Catalonia’s Economic Aptitude), 
which became quite influential upon its publication in 
1927. He was a member of a Spanish delegation that was 
invited to visit the USSR in the autumn of 1931 to study the 
feasibility of forging commercial relations between the two 
states. Later, between June 1937 and January 1939, Carles 
Pi i Sunyer was the Regional Minister of Culture and 
Education for the Generalitat de Catalunya. In exile he 
served as the Generalitat’s representative in London during 
World War II. Pi i Sunyer’s 1931 report on the USSR is em-
inently economic and praises the results of the five-year 
was also the consequence of the military impotence which 
obliged Lenin and Trotsky to accept the independence of 
the nationalities located under the German or Turkish pro-
tectorate in March 1918. After the separate peace with 
Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Bolshe-
viks had to face a three-year civil war which ended up 
bringing the country to its knees, yet which reinforced the 
dictatorship of the single party which gradually recon-
quered lands that they granted the guise of federated states. 
Despite all the contradictions, they never lost the sympa-
thies of many in Europe who believed that the revolution 
that was to spread to the entire continent after the Great 
War had gotten underway in Russia, an expectation which 
never came to fruition despite the attempts at revolution in 
Germany and Hungary immediately after the war.
Ángel Pestaña was the only CNT delegate who actually 
participated in the second Communist International con-
gress held in Moscow in July 1920. He was arrested upon 
his return. His report against the Soviet regime dated 
November 1921 was slow in being disseminated, but it pro-
ved to be decisive in the CNT’s official rupture with com-
munism in July 1922, when it learnt about the repression 
that the anarchists in the Soviet Union were undergoing.31
However, before that another CNT delegation had 
been sent to the founding congress of the Red Trade Un-
ion International in Moscow at a time when it had been 
forced underground in the midst of repression. The dele-
gation, made up of Andreu Nin, Joaquim Maurín, Hilari 
Arlandis, Jesús Ibáñez and Gaston Leval, attended the 
Moscow congress in July 1921. The first three became 
communists. In Catalonia, the first communist cell took 
shape within the CNT, not through a split-off with social-
ism, as in the rest of Spain. Andreu Nin came from a Cata-
lanist republican background. After that he moved to 
PSOE, where he had upheld Catalonia’s autonomy. Then 
he joined the CNT. While the remaining delegates re-
turned to Catalonia, Nin was arrested in Germany and de-
cided to go back to Moscow, where he became a leader of 
the Red Trade Union International. He lived there until 
his support for Trotsky’s thesis led to his dismissal by 
Stalin and his expulsion from the USSR in 1930. Nin then 
returned to Catalonia, where Maurín and others had set 
up a communist cell which was soon condemned by the 
small Partido Comunista de España (Communist Party of 
Spain, PCE). Shortly thereafter he was expelled from the 
CNT, which was dominated by the anarchists.32
In the 1920s, the prestige of the Soviet Union was so 
enormous that even the Catalanist social democrats in the 
Unió Socialista de Catalunya (Socialist Union of Catalo-
nia, USC) accepted it, albeit critically: “We prefer a Georgia 
enslaved to the Soviet Union over slavery to the bourgeoi-
sie”, they said in Justícia Social, the USC’s magazine. In 
November 1924, the same publication also claimed: “We 
esteem the Russian revolution with loyalty and sincerity. 
However this loyalty and this sincerity mean that we do 
not defame it like the bourgeoisie, yet nor do we pay fa-
natical devotion to it [...] we salute it as an outstanding 
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alities), where he sketched out a line that others would re-
peat and try to pursue further, including Maurín himself.
In any event, with the republican regime in Spain there 
was no further information about the USSR, which re-
mained a looming revolutionary myth.35 In view of the 
deterioration of the liberal parliamentary systems and the 
Great Depression, during the first half of the 1930s the 
USSR appeared to be the society of the future, with huge 
industrial growth and improvements in the workers’ liv-
ing conditions. It was an ideal made reality that encour-
aged revolutionary socialists everywhere and ended up 
holding appeal even among democrats who were alarmed 
at the spread of fascism.
When Hitler easily defeated German social democracy, 
the referent for other European socialists vanished. Not 
only did the loss of faith in liberal democracy contribute 
to promoting the Soviet model; rather the USSR also ap-
peared as the power the most consistently ready to stop 
fascism, especially when the communists adopted the tac-
tic of the popular anti-fascist fronts in France and Spain in 
1935, replacing their previous extremist isolation which 
had so heavily contributed to the rise of the Nazis in 
Germany.
In Catalonia, where the left was emerging from the re-
pression that came in the wake of the Sixth of October 
1934 uprising of the government of the Generalitat, pre-
sided over by Lluís Companys, the USSR, through the ad-
dition of Stalinism, began to become unquestionable not 
only among Marxists but also among Socialists, who had 
viewed it critically in the past – such as Rafael Campalans 
after his trip in 1933 –36 and even among the republican 
non-communist left, who had quite successfully allied 
with the socialist and communist groups in the February 
1936 elections in the Front d’Esquerres de Catalunya (Left 
Front of Catalonia), which was similar to the Frente 
plans, the progress of instruction and the morale of auster-
ity. He recognised that the people lived under a dictatorship 
dominated by Stalin.
In late 1935, Pi i Sunyer wrote: “If the new regime emerged 
victorious from these difficult times it was because, in rec-
ognising peoples’ right to their own personality, it took 
the support of national sentiment from the counter-revo-
lutionary movements. And today the Ukraine is a republic 
of 40 million inhabitants federated with the others that 
make up the Soviet Union [...] one gets the impression 
that Ukrainian sentiment has been largely satisfied. The 
Constitution promulgated in 1923 primarily to resolve 
the problem of the Ukraine and other southern lands 
states of the Soviet Union is founded upon mutual trust, 
equality, peaceful coexistence and the cooperation of its 
peoples. On this point, the constitution was largely in-
spired by Stalin, who since his youth has been familiar 
with the reality and the strength of national sentiments.” 
Pi i Sunyer also noted that Turkish was the co-official lan-
guage in Baku along with Russian, and that at schools in-
struction was provided in each of the eleven mother tongues 
spoken in the region.
In 1930, Jordi Arquer, who moved in the circles of retail 
clerks and office workers in favour of radical Catalan na-
tionalism, published El comunisme i la qüestió nacional i 
colonial (Communism and the National and Colonial Ques-
tion), a collection of Catalan-language texts by Marx, 
Lenin, Bukharin and Stalin on the question of nationalities 
presented as a guide for Catalan Marxists. Arquer had cre-
ated a group called the Partit Comunista Català (Catalan 
Communist Party), which joined the Federació Comunis-
ta Catalano-Balear (Catalan-Balearic Communist Federa-
tion) led by Joaquim Maurín. In 1931, Arquer published 
the leaflet Los comunistas ante el problema de las nacionali-
dades (Communists in View of the Problem of the Nation-
Figure 10. Andreu Nin, author of a 
Marxist formula for national 
emancipation.
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sie in defence of the oppressed nationalities. While the 
former often occurred, the latter rarely did since it is 
overly altruistic. Often, and Nin never said this, the so-
cialists and communists from the dominant nation have 
interpreted what has been none other than the subordi-
nation of the oppressed classes from the dominant na-
tionality and their collaboration with national oppres-
sion as this required worker solidarity.
Following communist orthodoxy, Nin did not want the 
workers from the different nationalities within a single 
state to organise themselves independently. It turns out 
that first, an integral confederalism has to be part of the 
political constitution, yet on the other hand, this confed-
eralism should not be applied to the revolutionary party 
of the proletariat which governs or aspires to govern. 
Andreu Nin concludes, “And thus, the Bolshevik party, 
which has practised consistent nationalitarian politics, has 
always been an essentially centralised organisation”. In 
short, the centralism of the party contradicted the federal-
ism of the nationalities, without Nin finding this in any 
way objectionable. Nin spoke as a more orthodox com-
munist, not as a critic, on such a crucial issue as the na-
tionalities within the Soviet Union, an issue that was even 
more important to Nin, who had had Catalan national 
awareness since his republican youth.
The memory of Marxist positions in favour of Catalan 
self-determination would later be lost. The compilation of 
texts from 1930 to 1936 edited by Josep Benet in 1974 un-
der the pseudonym of Roger Arnau and published by 
Paris-based publishing house Edicions Catalanes, entitled 
Marxisme català i qüestió nacional catalana, 1930-1936 
(Ca talan Marxism and the Catalan National Question, 
1930-1936), aimed to show the link between the social and 
national liberation that had been formulated by the Marxists 
of Catalonia in those years. The conclusions seemed so ob-
vious that Benet wrote no introductory study which would 
contextualise and relativise his compilation of texts. The 
two-volume book had not only historical but also political 
interest at a time when Marxism was the dominant ideol-
ogy among the ranks of anti-Francoists.
In the 1930s, the perspective of the Union of Iberian 
Socialist Republics, a name copied from the Soviet Union, 
was associated with the communist revolution and the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, even though it should be 
noted that the parties which were considered truly com-
munist were the vanguard of the proletariat with the con-
sequent right to hold power. Two vied for this role: the 
Partit Obrer d’Unificació Marxista (Workers’ Party of 
Marxist Unification, POUM) established in November 
1935 and led by Joaquim Maurín and Andreu Nin, and 
the Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC), formed 
in July 1936. Later this issue would cause bloodshed in 
May 1937 in Barcelona, and it would even cost the life of left-
ist Andreu Nin.
The core of the PSUC’s unconditional identification 
with the USSR can be found in the image of the latter as the 
leading bastion of anti-fascism worldwide and the only ef-
Popular (Popular Front) in the rest of Spain. The fact that 
the question of the nationalities had been satisfactorily 
addressed in the Soviet constitution was something even 
averred by the communists who criticised Stalin, such as 
Andreu Nin, who was a Trotsky follower until 1935, when 
he broke with him in the autumn of that year. The fact 
that Catalonia’s national liberation would only be effec-
tive if a communist revolution took place was the core 
thesis of Joaquim Maurín, who published his writings – in 
Spanish – in La Batalla, the Barcelona newspaper of the 
Bloc Obrer i Camperol (Workers’ and Peasants’ Bloc).
The main book on the issue was the one by Andreu 
Nin, Els moviments d’emancipació nacional (The Na-
tional Emancipation Movements), published in 1935 by 
Barcelona’s Proa publishing house, which became a clas-
sic. It was reissued by Paris’ Edicions Catalanes in 1970, 
while a French edition was issued by Paris’ Syros publish-
ing house in 1975 and a Spanish version by Barcelona’s 
Fontamara in 1977. 
With the authority conferred on him from having lived 
in the USSR and being not an unconditional follower of 
Soviet communism but a critic of it, Nin presented the 
USSR, as it was established in 1922, as the perfect solution 
for the rights of the nations inside it. “The USSR,” wrote 
Nin, “is the protoplasm of the future Union of Socialist 
Republics of Europe first, and of the Union of Universal 
Socialist Republics later. Its doors are open to all the 
workers’ republics that are established.” This cosmopoli-
tan idealism was his conclusion. Nin never managed to 
publish the second part, which he had announced, in 
which he was going to apply his thesis to Catalonia.
The book is basically doctrinaire and theoretical more 
than socio-political. After declaring that the national move-
ments had a democratic content that the proletariat should 
uphold without reservations, Nin condemned the fact that 
the pseudo-internationalist position, which denies nation-
alities and preaches the establishment of large units, practi-
cally advocates the absorption of small nations by large ones 
and therefore oppression. Since this position, criticised by 
Nin, was indeed the point of view of a considerable number 
of socialists and anarchists around him in Catalonia and 
Spain, there is no denying the interest that his condemna-
tion held back then and still holds today.
However, to Nin, who followed Lenin, the indisputa-
ble recognition of separation did not entail propaganda 
in favour of secession. Separation is not always a gradual 
deed; rather it should be judged according to the higher 
interest of the social revolution, an interest that is de-
fined by the communist party in power or in the opposi-
tion. Recognition of the right to separation lowers the 
dangers of disintegration, claimed Nin, and strengthens 
the required solidarity among the workers of the differ-
ent nations within a state. The revolutionary workers 
from the oppressed nationalities have to combat their 
national bourgeoisie and strengthen their union with 
the proletariat of the dominant nationality, while the lat-
ter have to combat their dominating national bourgeoi-
Catalan Historical 6 (Eng).indd   100 25/06/13   11:49
Catalanism and national emancipation movements in the rest of Europe between 1885 and 1939  Cat. Hist. Rev. 6, 2013   101
However, certainly the fact that gives an idea of the 
real extent of Sovietism beyond the communist ranks in 
Catalonia during the Civil War was a liberal democrat 
like Rovira i Virgili’s acceptance of the presidency of the 
Associació Catalana dels Amics de la Unió Soviètica 
(Catalan Association of Friends of the Soviet Union).38
After the anarchosyndicalists left the government of 
the Generalitat de Catalunya after the Fets de Maig (Deeds 
of May) in 1937, the Catalan government was made up of 
a coalition of the ERC – the party to which Rovira i Virgili 
belonged – and the PSUC – which aspired to consolidate 
its recognition by the Communist International as a na-
tional, independent party. There was considerable criti-
cism of Stalin from all fronts, criticism that was inadmis-
sible for the only power that was indeed a friend of the 
Spanish republican cause and of anti-fascist Catalonia. 
Failing to respect this taboo would cost the POUM, Andreu 
Nin’s party, dearly, but it would come at a particularly high 
price for Nin himself.
In this context, and when the republican defeat became 
inevitable, Rovira i Virgili made the unavoidable trip to 
the USSR in November 1938, a journey, just like all of its 
kind, perfectly orchestrated by the official guides to show 
the best side of the regime and Soviet society, without any 
chance to enter into contact with the real society outside 
the scheduled programme. Rovira wrote a chronicle of his 
visit in the magazine Meridià and his party’s newspaper, 
La Humanitat. The instalments appeared until the 14th of 
January 1939, just twelve days before the fall of Barcelona 
to Franco’s troops.
Rovira i Virgili believed Stalin’s words when he decla-
red that the Soviet Union was a multinational state whose 
internal cohesion could be the envy of any national state 
in the world. He also seemed to believe in the effectiveness 
of the constitutional right that any of the thirteen Soviet 
republics could separate whenever they wanted, and he be-
lieved in the absence of Russian cultural imperialism. 
“Therefore, the example of the USSR proves,” wrote Rovira 
i Virgili in December 1938, “that it is feasible to give states 
an authentic, durable and lasting unity without appealing 
to the procedures of absorption and domination that char-
acterise political centralisation.”
One aspect which inspired Rovira i Virgili’s admiration 
was the lack of symmetrical uniformity in Soviet federalism. 
In addition to republics, the USSR also contained autono-
mous regions. The number of republics had risen from the 
four initial ones in 1922 to thirteen before the war in 1939. 
There was no standardising symmetry, which must have 
been quite appealing to a Catalan nationalist like Rovira, 
even though the disproportionate weight between Russia 
and the others meant that outside the leader, they all fell into 
a secondary periphery with the exception of the Ukraine.
Rovira i Virgili could not deny the strength of Moscow’s 
central power, and he defined the Soviet system as an at-
tenuated federalist regime compared to the American and 
Swiss federal models. However, Rovira also warned: “In 
contrast, Soviet federalism gives the federated republics a 
fective support for the Spanish Republic during the Civil 
War, which it interpreted as a war to defend democracy 
against fascism in the context of the Communist Inter-
national’s support of popular fronts. In this sense, the 
POUM’s criticism of Stalin’s purges was condemned as in-
admissible disloyalty by the PSUC and the USSR’s consul in 
Barcelona, Antónov-Ovsèienko. The Trotskyist stigma that 
the PSUC applied to the POUM, despite the latter’s lack of 
any ties with Trotsky, projected what in Stalin’s USSR was 
synonymous with traitor and enemy of true communism.
The PSUC, created not from a split-off from socialism 
but from the merger of four groups (two of which were 
socialist), violated the principle of a single party for each 
state. Alongside the PCE, the PSUC would be a member 
of the Communist International, which it joined at the 
moment it was founded, to Moscow’s surprise. This direct 
affiliation with the Communist International may have 
been the most eloquent outside recognition of the Catalan 
nation,37 yet the privilege did not last long. The Komin-
tern was dissolved in 1943 in order to avoid the mistrust 
of the British and American governments, which were the 
USSR’s indispensable allies in the war that Hitler had de-
clared in June 1941. The PSUC then lost the direct inter-
national recognition it had managed to secure. In exile, 
the independence of the Catalan communists increasingly 
became more apparent than real in relation to the PCE, 
which also depended on Moscow.
Before the republican defeat in 1939, the PSUC contained 
real Catalanists who, enmeshed in the tragic dealings of the 
Civil War and trailing behind the Spanish communists, un-
wittingly found themselves supporting the minimisation of 
the Generalitat de Catalunya’s real capacity to govern with-
out these sacrifices helping them to win the war. The PSUC 
lost many of its ranks in immediate exile. There were life-
long social democrats in the Catalan communist party who 
were uneasy with Stalinism – they called it Bolshevikisation 
– and were ultimately faced with the unpleasant surprise of 
the German-Soviet pact in August 1939, the clearest subor-
dination of international communist politics to Russia’s 
short-term national interests. Stalin showed no qualms 
about signing the pact with Hitler in World War II and had 
absolutely no consideration for the fate of Poland. Nor did 
he respect the sovereignty of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Finland, which were invaded with the goal of regaining all 
the lands from the former Russian Empire. Since they had 
capitalist systems, ideologically these countries earned no 
consideration from Moscow.
But let us go back to 1936. At that time, the Soviet myth 
was not exclusive to the workers’ movement, with the ex-
ception of the anarchists; rather it was one of the character-
istics of the popular front in Catalonia. With the Civil War, 
this vision of the USSR as the only true, effective friend of 
republican Catalonia became even more prevalent and un-
contested. Yet it required ignoring the aggression against 
and conquest of Georgia (Stalin’s homeland) in 1921 and 
the fact that Georgia, when it was invaded, had been gov-
erned by socialists, not by counter-revolutionaries.
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freedom that the particular states of the federation have 
nowhere else, and that is the freedom to separate freely 
from the Union at each state’s will”.39 Under those cir-
cumstances, Rovira i Virgili forgot that the Soviet army’s 
occupation and the exclusive domination of the single 
party under Stalin’s autocracy rendered the exercise of 
this right of self-determination until separation of the na-
tions that made up the USSR totally unfeasible. However, 
he believed that they did not separate because they were 
satisfied.
Rovira i Virgili did not bear in mind the hundreds of 
thousands of victims of the Stalinist purges, which even af-
fected many communist party members during the Spanish 
Civil War. Both the Soviet ambassador to the Spanish Re-
public, Marcel Rosenberg, and the consul of the USSR to 
Barcelona, the popular Vladimir Antónov-Ovsèienko, lost 
their lives in these purges. While censorship prevented 
these deeds from being publicised, they should not have es-
caped Rovira i Virgili’s attention as a journalist and well-
informed person. We should also take into account the fact 
that André Gide had also spread the news about the scandal 
of the Soviet purges even though he had once been an en-
thusiastic supporter of Soviet communism.
Living in France in exile, and upon the German-Soviet 
pact in late August 1939 which unleashed the Nazi invasion 
of Poland and World War II, Rovira i Virgili was able to 
express himself with greater freedom after the alliance be-
tween the remnants of the ERC and the PSUC had been 
shattered. At that time, late 1939, articles about Rovira i 
Virgili’s journey to the USSR that he had left half-written 
had just appeared in Revista de Catalunya, which was then 
being published in Paris. Now, of course, his viewpoint was 
more critical, but the similarities outweigh the differences 
and the rectifications are barely perceptible. He said, for ex-
ample, that before Stalin’s about-face – the German-Soviet 
pact – there had been a trend towards democratisation in 
the USSR following the pattern of the popular fronts in 
France and Spain, even though Rovira expressed doubts 
about the continuity of that democratisation by the time 
the last articles in the series were being published.
Rovira i Virgili died in Perpignan in 1949. He never 
witnessed the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, or the de-
composition of the state party, or the paralysis of the 
Soviet army in its efforts to keep the empire together. 
The right to self-determination until separation was fi-
nally being applied, but only as a result of the fact that 
the solidity of that power was much lower than everyone 
had imagined, beginning with its own enemies.40 The 
Soviet model did not work. However, for a long time, 
even after de-Stalinisation, the mirage of the Soviet solu-
tion to the national question had persisted among Cata-
lan leftists, as if a lack of democracy and political free-
dom were compatible with a true federal pact among 
diverse nationalities.41
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